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So much has been written about proximate cause that any
professor who feels an article coming on would do well to coil
it and sit on it and hold his peace. Everything worth saying
on the subject has been said many times, as well as a great
deal more that was not worth saying. Proximate cause remains
a tangle and a jungle, a palace of mirrors and a maze, and the
very bewildering abundance of the literature defeats its own
purpose and adds its smoke to the fog.'
Rather than heed the words of so noted a legal scholar, I, armed with pen
and pad, again attack the pinnacles of proximate cause. Though I lack
the profundity of the men who first assailed these "walls of Jericho2,"' I
am moved to embattle so ubiquitous a concept not by personal ambition
but rather by the growing number of judicial opinions which utilize prox-
imate cause to retard the recognition and development of new fields of
tort liability.
While much disagreement and confusion surround the concept of prox-
imate cause, there are some issues upon which most legal scholars and
commentators agree. Among these are that: (1) some reasonable (causal)
connection between the defendant's act or omission and the injuries for
which the plaintiff seeks compensation must exist;3 (2) the plaintiff bears
the burden of proof on the issue of causation; 4 (3) proximate cause is a
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulsa University Law School; B.A., University
of Mississippi, 1982; J.D., University of Mississippi Law School, 1984; L.L.M.,
Columbia University Law School, 1987.
1 William L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REv. 389 (1950).
2 The Biblical walls of Jericho were believed to protect the inhabitants of the
city from their enemies. Although the strength of Jericho's walls was renowned
throughout the land, they fell before a shout from the people of Israel who put
their faith and trust in the power of God. Joshua 6:1-27.
3 Most lawyers were introduced to proximate cause as first-year law students
in the context of analyzing the prima facie case requirements for negligence.
Proximate cause or legal cause is not only an essential element of a negligence
action but a causal connection must also exist prior to recovery for any tort
whether based on negligence, intent or strict liability.
4 The burden of the proof observation is significant to the focus of this article.
There are a number of instances in which courts have relied on public policy to
carve out exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1948); Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
833 (1984).
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question of fact to be determined by the jury;5 and, (4) issues such as
causation in fact, apportionment of damages, liability for unforeseeable
consequences, superseding causes, shifting responsibility, duty to plain-
tiff, and plaintiffs fault may come within the rubric of proximate cause.6
This article examines the judicial justification for the nonrecognition
of educational malpractice as a theory of tort liability. Section I focuses
on the various factual contexts in which educational malpractice claims
have arisen and analyzes the concept of duty and proximate cause in the
different factual contexts. Section II discusses the common law principles
which demonstrate that the analytical problems associated with educa-
tional malpractice are not new to the law. Section III examines public
policy as a distinct component of the duty-proximate cause inquiry. Sec-
tion IV also focuses on public policy as expressed by various state leg-
islatures regarding the teaching profession and teacher accountability.
This article concludes that educational malpractice is a viable theory of
tort liability and that traditional negligence analysis and public policy
support the recognition of such a cause of action. Teachers, like other
professionals, should be subject to legal action when their conduct falls
below an acceptable standard.
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND THE TORT OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
Educational malpractice has historically lacked recognition in the law
of torts. The notion of educational malpractice as a cause of action has
been overwhelmingly resisted by American courts which have addressed
it.7 Courts have reasoned that such actions do not conveniently fit into
the typical negligence framework of duty, breach, proximate cause, and
damages. 8
5Even this issue is not without disagreement. An overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions are in accord; however, Prosser seemingly suggests that the question
of proximate cause is a question of law for the trial judge to determine. See W.
PAGE KEETON, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 42, at 273
(5th ed. 1984).
6 See id., at 279; Prosser, supra note 2, at 374.
7 See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct.
App. 1976); Donahue v. Copiague Union Free School District, 391 N.E.2d 1352
(N.Y. 1979); DSW v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, 628 P.2d 554(Alaska 1981); Tubell v. Dade County Public School, 419 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 453 A.2d
814 (Md. 1982). Cf. B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982) (cause of action
recognized for educational malpractice where state failed to comply with statute.
The court specifically noted that the claim at issue was of a different genre than
other educational malpractice claims.).
8 See cases cited, supra note 7. Courts have generally treated claims for indi-
vidual injury from educational malpractice essentially as claims of negligence.
But see Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582 (Md.
1982) (court refused to recognize educational malpractice claim based on negli-
gence but expressed willingness to recognize action on an intentional tort theory).
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At least one commentator has classified educational malpractice claims
into four distinct tort actions:
(1) failure to adequately counsel or educate students. This classification
arises in an educational malpractice claim where the plaintiffs argue that
the public school failed to adequately teach a student basic academic
skills.9 The plaintiffs claim that the public school district breached a duty
owed to them under the common law, the constitution, or statutory pro-
visions. They also allege that the public school district is liable for neg-
ligently representing that a student was performing at or near grade
level in basic academic skills.1°
(2) failure to make proper evaluation and placement of students into
suitable educational programs and facilities. These claims by students
maintain that they were improperly placed in, removed from, or negli-
gently failed to be placed in, a special education program.1
(3) failure to provide proper medical diagnoses or treatment. This clas-
sification appears in a case where a medical student was sued as a de-
fendant in a medical malpractice action for his participation in the
delivery of a baby. The student brought a subsequent action against the
director of medical education at the hospital alleging that he was neg-
ligently supervised and as a proximate result was sued for malpractice.12
Another example involves a plaintiff who was allegedly injured due to
the negligence of a chiropractor. The plaintiff sought to join the institution
as a party based on the theory that it had inadequately trained and
instructed one of its former students.13
(4) failure to warn or protect students from another's illness-related
dangerous proclivity.14 The factual differences between these various
claims support the view that more than four causes of action may exist
under the auspice of educational malpractice because of the ambigious
nature of the concept. This type of educational malpractice claim does
not fit into any of the four distinct subclasses. This fact is illustrated in
a claim involving a student-athlete whom a university knew was unable
to succeed in college-level courses. The university advised the student-
athlete to take "soft" courses to maintain his eligibility to compete in
sports. At the end of four years, and after his eligibility had expired, the
9 See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854 (Ct. App. 1976); Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 439
A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); Donahue v. Copiague Union Free School District, 391 N.E.2d
1352 (N.Y. 1979).
10 See cases cited, supra note 9.
1 See, e.g., Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979); DSW v.
Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Tubell
v. Dade County Public Schools, 419 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Doe v.
Board of Education, 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982); B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont.
1982); Helm v. Professional Children's School, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. 1980).
12 See, e.g., Swidryk v. Saint Michael's Medical Center, 493 A.2d 641 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
13 Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986).
14 WILLIAM D. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, § 19.71 at 269
(1985).
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student's reading and language skills were comparable to those of a sev-
enth and fourth grader, respectively.15
Judicial adherence to the notion of a traditional negligence framework
and analysis has resulted in the factual differences in educational mal-
practice claims being treated as irrelevant. This shortcoming in itself
may be subjected to criticism. The legal concepts of duty and proximate
cause are, however, most often cited as the factors limiting the devel-
opment and recognition of educational malpractice as a theory of tort
liability. It should be noted from the outset that while duty and proximate
cause are sometimes treated as distinct analytical inquiries, such is not
always the case.16 Duty is not sacrosanct in and of itself, "[blut only an
expression of the sum total of these considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." 17 The
same policy concerns and considerations which are examined in the con-
text of whether a duty of care is owed are more often than not duplicated
in the proximate cause inquiry. The significant distinction between duty
and proximate cause is the role each concept plays in the analysis of a
negligence action. The duty inquiry is traditionally utilized to determine
whether a relationship exists that imposes upon the defendant a legal
obligation for the benefit of the plaintiff. 8
The typical duty-proximate cause analysis in an educational malprac-
tice claim can be illustrated by the facts of Ross v. Creighton University.
9
In Ross, the United States District Court of Illinois was confronted with
the following facts. In July 1987, Kevin Ross, a former college basketball
player, barricaded himself in a high-rise hotel room in downtown Chicago
and threw assorted pieces of furniture out of the window. As Ross recalled
it, the furniture "symbolized" the employees of Creighton University,
whose alleged misdeeds he blamed for the onset of this "major depressive
episode. ' 20 Ross's amended complaint claimed that Creighton caused this
episode and otherwise injured him by recruiting him to attend the school
on a basketball scholarship with knowledge that Ross, who scored nine
points out of a possible thirty-six on the American College Test, was
pitifully unprepared to attend Creighton, a private school whose average
student in 1978, the year Ross matriculated, scored 23.2 points on the
ACT.2
1
"Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see also
Wilson v. Continental Ins. Co., 274 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. 1979) (court rejected a claim
by a law student against Marquette University whereby the university encour-
aged the student to take a course in "mind control" before beginning law school.
Plaintiff alleged that the course caused him severe psychological disorders, re-
sulting in his having to drop out of school. The words educational malpractice
were not used in the opinion.)
" See supra note 5, and accompanying text.
17 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 332-33 (3rd ed. 1964).
"s KEETON, et al., supra note 5, § 53.
11 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
21 Id. at 1322.
21Id.
(Vol. 39:301
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Ross was a high school basketball star in Kansas City, Kansas when
Creighton recruited him. Creighton knew that Ross was highly unlikely
to succeed in college-level studies but kept him eligible for the basketball
team by recommending that he enroll in "bonehead" (Ross's description)
courses such as ceramics, marksmanship, and the respective theories of
basketball, track and field, and football. 22 Under University rules, Creigh-
ton would not have accepted the pursuit of this esoteric curriculum by a
non-athlete. "After four years, when his basketball eligibility expired,
Ross had earned only 96 of the 128 credits required to graduate, main-
taining a 'D' average. His reading skills were those of a seventh-grader;
his overall language skills, those of a fourth-grader."23
The first count of Ross's three-count complaint asserted elements of
negligent infliction of emotional distress and educational malpractice.4
Judge Nordberg, author of the opinion, noted that educational malprac-
tice claims have been repeatedly rejected by American courts.2 5 The con-
clusion of the court in Ross not to recognize a cause of action for
educational malpractice was based on three considerations: (1) the prac-
tical impossibility of proving that the alleged malpractice of the teacher
proximately caused the learning deficiency complained of;2 6 (2) the ques-
tion of whether there is a duty owed to such plaintiffs; 27 and, (3) public
policy.2
The Ross court analyzed the educational malpractice issue from a un-
ified duty-proximate cause perspective.2 9 Under this approach, the concept
of foreseeability blends these otherwise distinct inquiries into an overall
consideration of whether tort recovery should be permitted as a matter
of policy.2 0 The unified duty-proximate cause analysis obscures the fact
that duty, as a distinct legal concept, is primarily concerned with whether
a special relation exists between the plaintiff and the defendant which
gives rise to an obligation of conduct. In other words, do the interests of
the plaintiff merit legal protection against the invasion which has in fact
occurred? 31
Ordinarily, a defendant's conduct constitutes negligence if it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm. The reasonableness of the risk-whether
expressed in terms of duty or proximate cause, or regarded as a question
of law or fact-turns on how the utility of the conduct or the manner in
22 Id.
2 Id.
24 Ross v. Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
25 Id. at 1327.
21 Id. at 1328.
2? Id.
21 Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1329. See also Felty v. New Berlin Transit, Inc., 374
N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1978); Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 493 N.E.2d
1022 (Ill. 1986).
Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1328.30 Id.
1l See KEETON, et al., supra note 5, § 42.
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which it is done is viewed in relation to the magnitude of the risk.32 The
balancing of the magnitude of the risk with the utility of the defendant's
conduct requires a consideration by the court and jury of the societal
interests involved.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests a number of factors which
should be considered in determining the utility of the defendant's con-
duct.33 Factors which are included are the social value that the law at-
taches to the interest to be advanced or protected by the conduct; the
extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected by
the particular course of conduct; and the extent of the chance that such
interest can be adequately advanced or protected by another and less
dangerous course of conduct.3 4 Application of these factors to the facts of
Ross reveals a startling reality in regard to the claim of educational
malpractice.
Education is a professional service with a high utility. It is the prime
characteristic of American society35 and a significant factor in determin-
ing the social and economic successes a child will experience in life. The
question under the facts of Ross, however, is whether education is the
sole or even predominant interest advanced by Creighton University's
conduct. A strong argument can be made that Creighton's interest was
the well-being of its athletic program.3 6 Consequently, the social value of
the conduct diminishes. Creighton's interest in recruiting athletes, rather
than education, should be weighed against the magnitude of the risk of
harm. The Restatement Second of Torts suggests that the following factors
should be considered in measuring the magnitude of the risk of harm:
the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are im-
periled; the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an
invasion of any interest of another member; the extent of the harm likely
to be caused to the interests imperiled; and the number of persons whose
interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect in harm 7 The
interest of the plaintiff is placed on the scale in analyzing the magnitude
of the risk.
Although education has yet to be recognized as a constitutionally pro-
tected right,38 its social value and import has elevated it to the level of
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) provides:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving
a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent
if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the
utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.
331 Id. at § 292.
Id.
31 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
- This argument is supported by the following facts: Creighton knew that Ross
was incapable of doing college-level studies; Creighton undertook to keep him
eligible by recommending that he take "bonehead courses"; and Creighton vio-
lated its own academic policy by allowing Ross to enroll in such courses. Ross v.
Creighton University, 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 32.
m San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[Vol. 39:301
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a "legitimate entitlement ' 9 and "a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.."40 Renowned judges and laymen alike agree that
education is very important in today's society. 41 A child's ability to acquire
a decent job and income and to provide his or her children with these
opportunities are all determined, in part, by the quality of his education.
The utility of Creighton's conduct when compared to the magnitude of
the risk falls short of that which should be protected by public policy.
The facts of Ross when compared to the other factual contexts of ed-
ucational malpractice claims are clearly outrageous. Consequently, it is
only fair to examine the duty-proximate cause problem in a more typical
educational malpractice fact pattern. Assume, for example, that a former
high school student is suing his high school for failure to teach basic
academic skills such as reading and writing. The question of whether the
teacher and school owed the student a duty to teach arises. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, referred to above, certainly supports an affir-
mative response. More important, however, is the fact that the other
generally accepted analytical standards for duty support the same con-
clusion. For example, if the risks inherent in a failure to properly educate
are examined, it is reasonable to conclude that a failure to educate in our
high-tech society creates an unreasonable risk of harm to both the in-
dividual and society.
Likewise, the concept of nonfeasance 4 2 may be utilized to create an
affirmative duty where one did not originally exist. The principle of non-
feasance permits the law to impose a duty where there has been some
holding out, special relationship, promise, or undertaking by the defend-
ant.
When the duty inquiry is properly undertaken, several things become
apparent. First, the duty inquiry directs the focus to policy issues which
in turn determine the extent of the original obligation and its continu-
ance. In this context, the creation of a special relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant serves as the foundation for the imposition of
19 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
*0 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
41 See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. 483. Chief Justice Warren stated that:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id. at 493. See also THE SCHOOL IN THE SOCIAL ORDER: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRO-
DUCTION TO EDUCATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, (Francesco Cordasco et al. eds., 1970).
42 Nonfeasance is "a failure to perform a duty .... WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1220 (2d ed. 1983).
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legal responsibility. Second, if public policy supports the recognition of a
duty, it is illogical to conclude that a tort does not exist when the breach
of such a duty occurs. Under these circumstances, the reality is that the
tort exists, but the plaintiff, for whatever reason, cannot recover. From
an analytical viewpoint, however, resolution of the duty inquiry, in the
affirmative, operates to pass the question of negligence to the jury for its
determination of whether a breach has occurred.
43
Courts which base their decisions not to recognize educational mal-
practice as a theory of tort liability solely on the difficulty or presumed
impossibility of proving duty-proximate cause are trapped within a con-
ceptual vortex whose depth and diameter are based solely on the most
primitive form of legal reasoning. This conclusion is supported by the
following excerpt on the effects of legal concepts on legal reasoning:
If the society has begun to see certain significant similarities
or differences, the comparison emerges as a word [duty-prox-
imate cause]. When the word is finally accepted it becomes a
legal concept. Its meaning continues to change. But the com-
parison is not only between the instances which have been
included under it and the actual case at hand, but also in terms
of hypothetical instances which the word by itself suggests.
Thus the connotation of the word for a time has a limiting
influence-so much so that the reasoning may even appear to
be simply deductive.
The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built
up as cases are compared. This period is one [in] which the
court fumble[s] for a phrase ... The second stage is the period
when the concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by
example continues to classify items inside and out of the con-
cept. The third stage is the breakdown of the concept, as rea-
soning by example has moved far ahead as to make it clear
that the suggestive influence of the word is no longer desired.
44
The validity of this excerpt is supported by the fact that in all but one
instance educational malpractice claims have been summarily dismissed
solely on the basis of a presumed impossibility of proving duty-proximate
cause .45
- It is uniformly agreed that the issue of whether a duty exists is for the court
to decide and whether that duty has been breached is a question for the jury. The
issue of negligence can be removed from the jury's consideration if the court
determines overriding public policy consideration requires that a particular view
be adopted and applied in all cases. See, e.g., Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759
(Mich. 1977); Lannon v. Taco Bell, Inc., 708 P.2d 1370 (Col. App. 1985).
4 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING, 8-9 (1949). Legal
concepts are conservative and less amenable to change. See VILHELM AUBERT,
CONTINUITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LAW AND SOCIETY, 131-32 (1989).
41 See cases cited, supra note 7.
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The argument that courts have placed far too much reliance on pre-
sumed conceptual impossibilities is further strengthened by the case of
Donahue v. Copiague Union Free School District.46 In Donahue, the plain-
tiff was a 1976 graduate of Copiague Senior High School. Plaintiff's claim
was that although he received a certificate of graduation, he lacked even
the rudimentary ability to comprehend written English on a level suffi-
cient to enable him to complete applications for employment.
Plaintiff attributed this deficiency to the failure of the school to perform
its duties and obligations to educate him. Specifically, Donahue alleged
that the school, through its employees:
[Glave passing grades and/or minimal or failing grades in var-
ious subjects; failed to evaluate [his] mental ability and ca-
pacity to comprehend the subjects being taught to him at said
school; failed to take proper means and precautions that they
reasonably should have taken under the circumstances; failed
to interview, discuss, evaluate, and/or psychologically test
[him] in order to comprehend and understand such matter;
failed to provide adequate school facilities, teachers, admin-
istrators, psychologists, and other personnel trained to take
the necessary steps in testing and evaluation processes insofar
as [he] is concerned in order to ascertain the learning capacity,
intelligence and intellectual absorption on the part of [plain-
tiffl. 47
Unlike Judge Nordberg in Ross, Judge Jasen, in the Donahue opinion,
did not tax his analysis by relying on legal concepts such as duty and
proximate cause to justify his conclusion that a proper educational mal-
practice case was not before the court. Rather, Judge Jasen concluded
that the facts before the court were not such as would entitle the plaintiff
to relief under any circumstances. He further noted that even within the
structures of traditional negligence, a complaint sounding in educational
malpractice may be made.48 He further expressed that it is not far-fetched
to assume that a duty of care is owing "from educators, if viewed as
professionals, to their students.."49 Regarding proximate cause, it was
expressed that "while this element may be difficult, if not impossible, to
prove in view of the many collateral factors involved in the learning
process, it perhaps assumes too much to conclude that it could never be
established."50
Donahue draws a distinction between the ability to plead a cause of
action and the public policy concern of whether such claim should be
46 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
17 Id. at 1353.
48 Id.
49 Id.
w Id. at 1353-54.
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entertained. This approach, while rendering a similar result as in Ross,
is totally devoid of reliance on legal concepts such as duty and proximate
cause. Furthermore, this approach to the problem recognizes that there
may be instances in which the violation is so gross that courts, fulfilling
their proper function, would be obliged to recognize and correct the wrong.
The conclusion that educational malpractice claims should be heard on
a case-by-case basis is supported by B.M. v. State.51 The plaintiff's com-
plaint in B.M. alleged that the state of Montana negligently classified
her as retarded and later negligently placed her in a special education
program when she was six years old. The trial court entered summary
judgment for the defendant concluding that the state owed no legal duty
of care to students negligently classified and placed in special education
programs. Judge Shea, writing for the Supreme Court of Montana, re-
versed this finding, noting that "we have no difficulty in finding a duty
of care owed to special education students. The general tenor of education
for all citizens in Montana is stated in Art. X, section 1, 1972 Mont.
C onst.
' '
-
2
Judge Shea, relying on Montana education statutes, applied a violation-
of-statute analysis to the question of duty. Under this approach, the stat-
utes establish the existence of a special relationship between plaintiff
and defendant and also define the level of care owed. The facts of B.M.
were judicially observed to be distinguishable from other educational
malpractice claims.53
II. ANALOGOUS COMMON LAW PRECEPTS
Basic common law principles support recognition of the tort of educa-
tional malpractice. The American common law tradition can be traced
as far back as the Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress.54
Since that time, American common law has served as the outline for an
ideal order of society and as a body of ideals to which conduct should be
required to conform. The ideals, their interpretations and application
have been guided and shaped by legislation, judicial reasoning and doc-
trinal writings.
The common law tradition is well accepted in current analytical jur-
isprudence. Jurists who utilize it seek to organize the ideal element of
the law to furnish a critique of old received ideals and give a basis for
formulating new ones, and to yield a reasoned canon of values and a
technique of applying it."
51 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
52 Id. at 427.
1Id. at 428.
-In the Declaration of Rights, the common law of England was asserted as
the measure of rights of Americans. See HENRY S. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, document # 56, 82-84 (1943).
15Id. at 49.
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Contrary to belief, legislation has had little effect on the common law
tradition. 56 Legislation or statutory law has had its most significant im-
pact in the areas of federal and state constitutions, bill of rights, criminal
laws, and estates and trusts. Legislation in the civil arena, on the other
hand, has basically taken the form of codification of judicially created
"common law" precepts. Consequently, judicial deference to the legisla-
ture is without significant historical precedence. 7 Furthermore, legis-
lation receives little, if any, attention in our system of traditional legal
education, 58 thus undermining the notion that a wrongfully injured per-
son should first seek redress from the legislative body.
The common law is a system of law which originated and developed in
England. It is based on custom, doctrines, and usages found in court
opinions. 59 More than half a century ago Roscoe Pound noted that:
The pressure of new interests has required that the taught
tradition be made to serve new purposes as old doctrines were
called on to solve new problems. There has been a gradual
shaping of obstinate traditional precepts and traditional doc-
trines through the need of applying them to new economic
conditions in the light of reshaping ideals of the legal order.
Old analogies are developed by the traditional technique to
meet problems arising from newly pressing unrecognized and
unsecured interests.60
The presumption that duty-proximate cause will be difficult or impos-
sible to prove is not unique to educational malpractice claims, nor is it
novel to the common law. This presumption hindered the recognition and
development of the common law tort of infliction of emotional distress for
a number of years. As early as 1861, Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v.
Knight6' expressed that "[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value,
and does not pretend to redress. -.62 The conclusion that mental anguish
had no place in the law soon found its way into American jurisprudence
where one learned jurist noted:
If the right [to recover] in this class of cases should be once
established, it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in
cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned
'5 See R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW, 38-45 (1938); Cf. G.
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, 14-27 (1986).
51 See authorities cited, supra note 56.
51 Law schools uniformly teach law, not laws. The teaching of law is in "the
spirit of the common legal heritage of English speaking people." R. POUND, supra
note 56, at 83.
59 See G. POSTEMA, SUPRA note 56, at 14; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
276-77 (6th ed. 1990).
R. POUND, supra note 56, at 83-84.61 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
62 Id. at 863.
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without detection, [and] where the damages must rest upon
mere conjecture and speculation. The difficulty which often
exists in cases of alleged physical injury, in determining
whether they exist, and, if so, whether they were caused by
the negligent act of the defendant, would not only be greatly
increased, but a wide field would be opened for fictitious or
speculative claims. To establish such a [claim] would be con-
trary to principles of public policy.6
As late as 1934, the common law had still not come to grips with the
idea that a person had a protectable interest in mental and emotional
tranquility.6 Inroads were, however, being made and, by 1950, a large
body of doctrinal writings65 and case law66 had developed supporting the
position that the law should protect emotional and mental tranquility.
In recognition of this development, the American Law Institute amended
§ 46 of the Restatement of Torts in 1947 to provide: "One who without a
privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to an-
other is liable (a) for such distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from
it. ' ' 67 This event marked the acceptance of emotional distress or mental
anguish as a distinct theory of tort liability.68 Since that time, competent
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (N.Y. 1896) (overruled by
Battalla v. State, 45 N.E. 354 (1896)).
6 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934). The interest in mental and emotional
tranquility and, therefore, in freedom from mental and emotional disturbance is
not, as a thing in itself, regarded as of sufficient importance as to require others
to refrain from conduct intended to cause such a disturbance. Id. at comment c.
- See, e.g., Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damages, 20
MICH. L. REv. 497 (1921); Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance
in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936); John W. Wade, Tort Liability
for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1950).
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Downton, 2. Q. B. 57 (1897); Barnett v. Collection Ser.
Co., 242 N.W. 25 (Iowa 1932); Richardson v. Pridmore, 217 P.2d 113 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1950); see also cases cited in W. J. Dunn, Annotation, Civil Liability for
Insulting or Abusive Language Not Amounting to Defamation, 15 A.L.R.2d 108
(1951).
61 The American Law Institute, in explanation of the amendment, stated:
The interest in freedom from severe emotional distress is regarded as of
sufficient importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended to
invade it.... The injury suffered by the one whose interest is invaded is
frequently far more serious to him than certain tortious invasions of the
interest in bodily integrity and other protected interest. In the absence of
a privilege the actor's conduct has no social utility .... No reason or policy
requires such an actor to be protected from liability ....
Comment d.
It should be noted that a number of restrictions existed initially regarding
recovery for infliction of emotional distress. For example, the majority of courts
allowed recovery only where plaintiff was able to show a manifestation of physical
consequences or physical impact. These restrictions have been abolished in a
majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324
(Miss. 1974) (authority cited therein). Common law restrictions regarding to re-
covery by third parties for emotional disturbances still remain. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Vallelunga, 339 P.2d 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp.,
197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Dillion v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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jurists and jurors have obscured the presumed proximate cause dilemma.
It is also significant that many jurists, during the early development of
infliction of emotional distress, espoused policy concerns69 similar to those
being asserted by contemporary jurists with regards to educational mal-
practice 70
At common law, school districts were accorded preferential treatment.
Early cases uniformly held that school districts, boards and agencies, in
the absence of an express statute to the contrary, were not liable for
injuries resulting from their negligence. 7 ' The rule of nonliability was
generally premised on the fact that school districts were agencies of the
state established for the promotion of education for which they derived
no benefit in their corporate capacity.72 A secondary rationale for the
nonliability rule was that public school funds should not be used to satisfy
damage claims occasioned by the negligence or wrongful act of agents or
servants of the school district.73 A number of exceptions and limitations
developed along with the governmental immunity (nonliability) rule. For
example, school districts could be held liable for: (1) a tort arising out of,
or committed in the performance of a proprietary as distinguished from
a governmental function or activity;74 (2) personal injury or death caused
by the creation or maintenance of a nuisance;7 ' (3) injury or death caused
by a positive wrong or a willful or intentional act;76 and, (4) the taking
of private property for public use without compensation. 77 The nonliability
rule was never extended to protect the agents or employees of schools,
such as teachers, for their personal liabilities.
78
Governmental immunity originated as a creature of the common law.
Accordingly, the doctrine could be judicially abolished or limited. In Mol-
itar v. Kaneland Community School District79 the Supreme Court of Il-
linois rejected the various reasons for the nonliability rule as unjust and
erroneous. Since that time the majority of states have judicially abolished
69 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
70 See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., Clark v. Nicholasville, 87 S.W. 300 (Ky. 1905); State Use of Weddle
v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 51 A. 289 (Md. 1902); Whitehead v. Board of Educ., 102
N.W. 1028 (Mich. 1905); Folk v. Milwaukee, 84 N.W. 420 (Wis. 1900); Wiest v.
School Dist. No. 24, 137 P. 749 (Or. 1914).
12 See supra note 71.
11 See, e.g., Ernst v. West Covington, 76 S.W. 1089 (Ky. 1903); Board of Educ.
v. Volk, 74 N.E. 646 (Ok. 1905).
14 See Riddoch v. State, 123 P. 450 (Wash. 1912); Holzworth v. State, 298 N.W.
163 (Wis. 1941).
15 See Bush v. City of Norwalk, 189 A. 608 (Conn. 1937); Jones v. Kansas City,
271 P.2d 803 (Kan. 1954); Molinari v. Boston, 130 N.E.2d 925 (Mass. 1955).
16 See Meyer v. Board of Educ., 86 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1952).
77 See Griswold v. Town Sch. Dist., 88 A.2d 829 (Vt. 1952).
78 See, e.g., Woodman v. Hemet Union School District, 29 P.2d 257 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1934); Gaincott v. Davis, 275 N.W. 229 (Mich. 1937).
229 (Mich. 1937).
79 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959).
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the doctrine of sovereign immunity reasoning that the doctrine: (1) was
manifestly unfair to injured persons; (2) tends toward governmental ir-
responsibility; and, (3) is an unnecessary exception to the policies of the
state.80 State legislatures have responded to the abolition of judicially
created sovereign immunity by enacting statutes dealing specifically with
the tort liability of all or certain governmental entities. Consequently,
where the legislature has failed to provide an immunity for schools there
are no factors counseling against the imposition of liability.
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE TORT OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
Public policy considerations are an integral part of the duty-proximate
cause inquiry. Public policy, in the literal sense, is an expression of the
"[c]ommunity common sense and common conscience.., and well-settled
public opinion relating to man's plain and palpable duty to his fellowmen,
having due regard to all circumstances of each particular relation and
situation.""' The arbiters of public policy are judges and legislators.
The public policy concerns inherent in educational malpractice claims
were judicially expressed in the often quoted passage from Peter W. v.
San Francisco Unified School District:8 2
On occasions when the Supreme Court has opened or sanc-
tioned new areas of tort liability, it has noted that the wrongs
and injuries involved were both comprehensible and assessable
within the existing judicial framework. This is simply not true
of wrongful conduct and injuries allegedly involved in educa-
tional malfeasance. Unlike the activity of the highway or the
marketplace, classroom methodology affords no readily ac-
ceptable standard of care, or cause, or injury. The science of
pedagogy itself is fraught with different and conflicting theo-
ries of how or what a child should be taught, and any layman
might-and commonly does-have his own emphatic views on
the subject. The "injury" claimed here is plaintiff's inability to
read and write. Substantial professional authority attests that
the achievement of literacy in the schools, or its failure, are
influenced by a host of factors which affect the pupil subjec-
tively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond
the control of its ministers. They may be physical, neurological,
emotional, cultural, environment, they may be present but not
perceived, recognized but not identified....
80 See Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982) (authority cited
therein).
11 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990).
82 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976).
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These recognized policy considerations alone negate an action-
able duty of care in persons and agencies who administer the
academic phases of the public education process. Others, which
are even more important in practical terms, command the same
result. Few of our institutions, if any, have aroused the con-
troversies, or incurred the public dissatisfaction, which have
attended the operation of the public schools during the last few
decades. Rightly or wrongly, but widely, they are charged with
outright failure in the achievement of their educational objec-
tives; according to some critics, they bear responsibility for
many of the social and moral problems of our society at large.
Their public plight in these respects is attested in the daily
media, in bitter governing board elections, in wholesale rejec-
tions of school bond proposals, and in survey upon survey. To
hold them to an actionable "duty of care," in the discharge of
their academic functions, would expose them to the tort
claims-real or imagined-of disaffected students and parents
in countless numbers. They are already beset by social and
financial problems which have gone to major litigation, but for
which no permanent solution has yet appeared. The ultimate
consequences, in terms of public time and money, would burden
them-and society-beyond calculation 83
Judicially expressed public policy concerns may be paraphrased as fol-
lows: that courts will be inundated with law suits; courts will have to
monitor the internal affairs of schools and school boards; and educational
malpractice actions will unduly burden a school's limited resources. These
judicial concerns, no matter how expressed, fail to recognize the nature
of professionalism and legislative reaction to problems in education in
general.
Professionalism entails the notion of malpractice which may be de-
scribed as "professional misconduct or unreasonable lack of skill.'8 4 Mal-
practice is the "failure of one rendering professional services to exercise
that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all circum-
stances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of
the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient
of those services or to those entitled to rely upon them."8 5
Are teachers professionals? Commentators are split on this critical
issue.8 6 Resolution of the issue of whether teachers are professionals plays
Id. at 860-861.
14 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990).
'Id.
See Alice J. Klein, Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy
the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (1979).
"Although definitions of a profession often exclude education, courts have de-
scribed educators as professionals, and public policy considerations support this
proposition." Id. at 41. But see Patrick D. Halligan, The Function of Schools, the
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an important role in the quest for teacher accountability because it de-
termines the appropriate standard of care to be applied under the cir-
cumstances. In most of the cases involving educational malpractice, the
majority opinions did not address this issue.8 7 Judge Davidson, dissenting
in Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County,8 expressed that
teachers are professionals based on the fact that they have special train-
ing, are certified by the state, and hold themselves out as possessing
superior skill, training and knowledge not possessed by ordinary members
of the community.89 Judge Davidson also stated that "as professionals
they [educators] owe a professional duty of care to children who receive
their services and a standard of care based upon customary conduct is
appropriate."90
The term professionalism further illustrates the spurious nature of
judicial arguments in regards to proof of duty. In Peter W. v. San Francisco
School District9l and Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,9 2
the courts rather dubiously expressed some trepidation with regard to
the standard of care. In both cases the courts were concerned with a
presumed inability of laymen to determine how reasonable persons would
have acted in the context of education. This concern was, however, un-
justified because the complaints in both cases alleged violations of profes-
sional conduct, which necessitates an inquiry into the custom of the
profession as opposed to the reasonable person.
Because of the abstract nature of education, courts have been reluctant
to impose liability on teachers and school districts for their failure to
teach. Teachers, schools and universities stand in loco parentis93 for the
benefit of both the child and his or her parents. This relationship was the
foundation for the trial of Socrates, the most famous teacher trial in
Status of Teachers and the Claims of the Handicapped: An Inquiry into Special
Education Malpractice, 45 Mo. L. REV. 667 (1980). Halligan notes that:
The role of a teacher is important, even critical. But it is not professional
in the sense intended by malpractice law. It is not a learned profession. It
is a role in which the discretion of individual performing members is closely
limited and does not require trust and confidence in the same manner that
the work of a physician or lawyer requires them.... [Tihe duty of a teacher
is to follow the orders of superiors.
Id. at 676-77.
87 See supra note 8.
- 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982).
11 Id. at 589.
- Id.
11 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976).
92 391 N.E. 2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
13 "In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously with a
parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th
ed. 1990). As originally conceived, the doctrine of in loco parentis was intended
to treat disciplinary matters; however, it has been expanded to include other
areas of the schooling process.
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history. 4 It also led then President Richard M. Nixon to state that
"schools, administrators and teachers alike are responsible for their per-
formance, and it is in their best interest as well as the interests of their
pupils that they be held accountable. '95
Since the Nixon era, state legislators have reacted to the subject of
education with a vast array of statutes dealing with the broader concerns
of education in general. These statutes express national, state, and com-
munity interest and commitment to quality education. They evince the
societal scrutiny to which the education profession has been subjected
and reflect legislative views of public policy in regard to education. These
statutes also serve as authoritative pronouncements on the duty of
schools. Included among these statutory provisions are those pertaining
to the qualifications 9 6 duties 9 7 and dismissal of teachers.99
Most statutes refer to teachers as professionals. The Georgia legislature
has gone one step further and statutorily expressed that teaching is a
professional service, with all similar rights, responsibilities, and privi-
leges accorded other recognized professions.9 9 The implication of such a
provision is that teachers, like physicians, attorneys and accountants,
owe a duty to those who rely on their services and are to be held to the
same standards as other professionals.
Some state legislatures have also created Professional Teaching Prac-
tices Commissions that are responsible for developing, through the teach-
ing profession, criteria of professional practice, including ethical and
25 AMERICANA ENCYCLOPEDIA, 165-168 (1979). In 399 B.C. Socrates, an 80-
year-old Athenian philosopher-educator, was charged with corruption of the
young and brought before a jury of 501 of his fellow citizens, who found him
guilty.
91 RENNARD STRICKLAND, ET AL., AVOIDING TEACHER MALPRACTICE: A PRACTI-
CAL LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR THE TEACHING PROFESSION, 63 (1976). See also Scheel-
haase v. Woodberry Community Central Sch. Dist., 488 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973)
(upholding a teacher's dismissal for her students having scored low on standard-
ized achievement tests) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
9 All states have statutes that require teachers to possess a teaching license,
which is often referred to as a teaching certificate, issued by the state board of
education or similar agency. See WILLIAM D. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE, App. Thl. 18, at 498 (1985).
97 The obligation of particular positions, as specified in written contracts, proj-
ect a range of implied duties including those that are reasonably incidental to
the contract terms. Id. § 12.22, at 242.
91 State statutes uniformly provide that teachers may be dismissed for reasons
such as immorality, incompetency, neglect of duty, misconduct, and insubordi-
nation. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-11-17 (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.030 (1990);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-508 (1990); CAL. [EDUC.] CODE § 44932 (West 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-301 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 14, §§ 1204 & 1420
(1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-940 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 297-11 (1990);
IDAHO CODE § 33-1208 (1990).
99 GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-792 (Michie 1991).
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professional performance.' ° ° These commissions, much like state medical
and bar associations, are empowered to conduct investigations and hear-
ings on alleged violations of ethical or professional teaching performance
or professional misconduct.101 These commissions can warn, reprimand,
suspend or revoke the certificate of a member of the profession. 10 2 These
statutes reinforce the generally accepted policy that a profession is re-
sponsible for creating the standard by which professional conduct is to
be judged.
The fact that disagreement exists within the teaching profession as to
a proper standard of care for educators is not unusual in the law of
professional malpractice. This, and similar problems, led to the devel-
opment of the customary practice and locality rules in the medical profes-
sion.10 3 The questions of whether a teacher has engaged in professional
misconduct or lacks the skill of the ordinary member of the profession
are not, in light of other types of professional malpractice claims, insur-
mountable barriers. Resolution of the problem may be found in the rule
that plaintiff put on expert testimony to establish the standard in the
community in question.
Several statutes authorize the board of education or a similar agency
to procure liability insurance to indemnify and protect teachers and other
employees against damages arising out of their employment whether
based on negligence, common law or violation of contract rights.-°4 The
comprehensive nature of education statutes suggests that public policy
supports the notion that teachers should be held professionally account-
able for incompetency.
100 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.440 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-65-105
(1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.261 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-795 (Michie
1991); IDAHO CODE § 33-1252, 1254 (1990).
,01 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.460 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-65-105
(1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.546 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-795 (Michie
1991).
102 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.470 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-65-105
(1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-796 (Michie 1991).
103 Evidence of customary practice is relevant and admissible in malpractice
actions against physicians, accountants and attorneys and may prove influential
with the jury. Customary practice is very significant in medical malpractice ac-
tions because the jury is usually instructed that the plaintiff cannot recover unless
he proves that the defendant's conduct was not consistent with recognized medical
practices. It is not enough that another physician states that he would have
proceeded otherwise. The plaintiff must establish that the physician in question
actually violated the recognized standard of the profession. See Keeton, et al.
supra note 5, at § 32.
The locality rule further requires that the plaintiff show the standard of learn-
ing and skill of the community in which the defendant practices. Satisfaction of
these rules often necessitates expert testimony by a local physician or one familiar
with the community standards. KEETON, et al., supra note 5, at 186-88.
-04 See GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-991 (Michie 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, Para.
10-22.3 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-110 (1991).
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The prima facie requirement for an action in negligence requires the
complaining party to prove some legally recognized duty owing from
defendant, a breach of that duty or a failure to act in accordance with a
standard of care, and proximate cause which is the causal relationship
between breach and injury. Proof of causation in educational malpractice
claims may prove extremely difficult in all but the most egregious cases.
This is not to say that causation can never be proven, nor does it support
a presumption of an impossibility of proving causation. Rather, the dif-
ficulty in proving causation operates as a built-in dam which curbs the
flood gates of litigation. The teacher-student relationship supports the
view that some causal relationship may exist between the conduct of a
teacher and the failure of a student to learn.
The preceding discussion negates the judicially expressed public policy
concerns noted earlier in this section. Recognition of miseducation claims
will not cause a tidal wave of litigation. The proximate cause requirement
will serve to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims and
consequently, restrain the latter. Miseducation claims will not unduly
burden a school's resources since most governmental agencies are re-
quired, by law, to be insured. Furthermore, teachers and other profes-
sional school employees can procure malpractice insurance much like
physicians and lawyers. Insurance is not novel to school boards, districts
or teachers. It has been used extensively to provide protection against
student claims for physical injury.
Judicial concern that courts will have to monitor the internal affairs
of schools and school boards is invalid. It is an established principle that
schools are primarily a state's responsibility. 1°0 Courts, however, have
traditionally invaded the state's educational domain to resolve legal is-
sues involving segregation 10 6 , due process' °7, funding'08 and physical in-
jury to students.109 Courts will frequently act when other branches of
government are unable, unwilling, or do not know how to act. Courts are
responsible for formulating solutions in order to assure that identified
harm is remedied.
No better statement of the harm that results from miseducation can
be found than that made by the Select Committee on Equal Education
Opportunity in 1974. The committee noted:
The costs of inadequate education are, for the most part, im-
measurable. For the individual, educational failure means a
lifetime of lost opportunities. But the effects are visited on the
Nation as well, for society as a whole also pays for the under-
education of a significant segment of the population.
105 ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS, 165-67 (1968).
106 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
107 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978).
108 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
10 See, e.g., Carbone v. Overfield, 451 N.E.2d 1229 (Ohio 1983); Thigpen v.
McDuffle County Bd. of Educ., 355 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. 1985).
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Unemployment and underemployment due to low levels of ed-
ucational attainment and underachievement reduce many cit-
izens' earning power. Reduced earnings translate into fewer
total goods and services, less tax support for Government, and
require the use of public budgets to pay for services that would
otherwise be provided through personal resources. Families
whose incomes are below the poverty line must be supported
with tax dollars to pay for food, housing, health services, job
training, remedial education, income maintenance and other
services. Low educational attainment is an important contrib-
utor to crime; the costs of crime prevention and control and
our judicial and penal systems are higher to the extent that
higher educational attainment and achievement would result
in reduced juvenile delinquency and adult crime....
Finally, the costs of poor education are not just limited to the
present generation. The children of persons with inadequate
education are themselves more likely to suffer the same edu-
cational and social consequences as their parents."0
IV. CONCLUSION
The consequences of miseducation are clearly identifiable and judicially
remediable. Nonetheless, judicial unwillingness to recognize the tort of
educational malpractice has provided the teaching profession with a gov-
ernmental immunity of sorts."' This result is manifestly unfair to persons
who are wrongfully injured due to the incompetence of others and fosters
irresponsibility. Accountability is a fertile area of litigation in the med-
ical, legal and accounting professions. The analytical standards and con-
cepts developed in these areas should be applied to the teaching
profession. 112
The concept of proximate cause was not developed as a tool to hinder
tort law development. Rather, this concept was merely intended to set
the bounds beyond which the defendant would not be legally responsible
for the consequences of his acts. Whether a defendant proximately caused
injury for which he may be held legally responsible depends upon whether
his conduct was so significant and important a cause that he should be
held liable. The significance and importance of the defendant's conduct
in turn depends upon public policy.
o FRANCESCO CORDASCO, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY: TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 171 (1974) (commonly referred to as "The Coleman Report".)
"I KEETON et al., supra note 5, at 1047-48.
,12 "The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example.... It is a
three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition
descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next
similar situation." EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING,
1-2 (1949).
[Vol. 39:301
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss3/4
1991] EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE (I) 321
Duty and proximate cause have come to be the words from the past
that are much spoken of, that have acquired a dignity of their own, and
to a considerable degree, control results. In the context of educational
malpractice, however, judicial opinions that rely upon these two inter-
related concepts do so without engaging in long-established and univer-
sally-accepted methods of legal analysis.
Public policy does not prohibit recognition of the tort of educational
malpractice. The failure of schools to achieve educational objectives has
reached epidemic proportions. Not only are many individuals deprived of
the learning they so desperately need, but society as a whole is beset with
social problems each time an improperly educated youth is passed into
the mainstream of American society. Available procedures do not ade-
quately deal with the problems created by incompetent teaching nor do
they provide adequate relief to wrongfully injured individuals. Therefore,
recognition of the tort of educational malpractice is consistent with the
common law tradition of providing a remedy to a person who has been
harmed by the conduct of another.
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